Client Overview
The organisation is a manufacturing conglomerate based in the Middle East with operations spanning building materials, industrial equipment, and consumer goods. The group operates four manufacturing plants, a logistics division, and a shared corporate services function, employing around 4,500 people across the GCC. A digital operations improvement programme initiated three years ago has resulted in the deployment of industrial IoT sensors, a manufacturing execution system, and enterprise-wide ERP — all of which require secure, trusted network communication.
The Challenge
As the group added IoT-enabled equipment and cloud-connected manufacturing systems, the need for trusted certificates within the operational technology environment became more pressing. The group's IT and OT teams were issuing self-signed certificates for internal system communication — a workable short-term solution that had become increasingly difficult to manage as the number of connected devices and systems grew. There was no certificate inventory for the OT environment, and replacing expired certificates on industrial systems required planned downtime, making reactive certificate management particularly disruptive. The group's cybersecurity team had flagged the OT certificate situation as a risk item, noting that the mix of unprotected and self-signed certificates created exploitable trust gaps in the manufacturing network.
“Managing certificates on industrial systems with no inventory and no plan is one of those risks that sits quietly on the register until something breaks. We decided to address it before something did.”
— Group Head of IT and OT Security
The Solution
eMudhra deployed emCA to establish a private CA for the group's IT and OT environments. The deployment included a Root CA and two subordinate Issuing CAs — one for IT systems and one for the OT environment — with separate certificate policies governing each domain. Private keys were protected in an HSM at the group's primary data centre. Certificate profiles were configured for enterprise application servers, API services, industrial IoT device authentication, and manufacturing execution system connections. A governed certificate request workflow was set up for each plant's IT coordinator, enabling them to request certificates for new equipment and systems through an online process rather than generating self-signed certificates locally. Self-signed certificates in the OT environment were replaced in a planned, phased migration to avoid production disruption.
Results
The phased OT certificate migration was completed across all four plants within 14 weeks. The cybersecurity team closed the OT certificate risk item following completion of the migration. The group has not experienced an unplanned production disruption related to certificate issues since the private CA went live.
Metric | Before | After |
OT certificate trust model | Self-signed; no inventory; exploitable gaps | Private CA issuing governed OT certs across 4 plants |
IT/OT certificate inventory | No inventory for OT environment | Full inventory under emCA management |
OT migration timeline | No migration plan; ongoing risk | All 4 plants migrated within 14 weeks |
Production disruptions from cert issues | Risk of unplanned downtime from reactive renewals | Zero unplanned disruptions post-deployment |
Cybersecurity risk register | OT certificate gap flagged as open risk | Risk item closed post-migration |